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BOOK REVIEWS

is never shown to be related to the forces shaping the personality of the
offender. From these facts, it follows that this volume is little more than a
collection of pornographic materials. One of the amazing statements made
by the author is found in the discussion of a "sadistic rapist." The author
draws the reader's attention to "the full lips and dreamy eyes, characteristic of the sexual criminal." Just how "full lips and dreamy eyes" are
related to the psychoanalytic explanation of criminal behavior is not made
dear by the author. A gruesome touch, for which there seems to be no
justification, is the inclusion of photographs of the victims of sexual acts.
These photographs reveal the bodies of the victims as they were mutilated
by the attackers. The relationship between these photographs and the
dynamics of abnormal behavior is far from clear.
Those who are interested in reading sensationalism will find much in this
book to attract them. The student of abnormal behavior will find little or
nothing to justify the time spent in reading the volume.
JESS SPIRER

DIRECTOR, UNIVERSITY GUIDANCE

CENTER

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI

By Edward H. Levi. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1949. Pp. 74. $2.00.

AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL

REASONING,

AccoRluNc to the jacket Mr. Thurman Arnold describes this volume as
. . . the greatest piece of jurisprudentia] writing that has ever come to
my attention .

. . ."

This statement rates with a more enthusiastic endorse-

ment of a brand of cigarettes, "I have never smoked anything but
cigarettes." There is a suspicion that the endorser has at one time or another
sneaked down a dark alley with a different brand. There is a stronger
suspicion that Mr. Arnold's reading has been wider than his statement
indicates. However that may be, it is true that this seventy-four page
reprint from the University of Chicago Law Review is an excellent analysis
of a judicial method of handling cases.
Mr. Arnold's endorsement may not be all to the good. Unlike the tobacco
endorsement which presumably increases sales, his reference to "jurisprudential writing" may serve to discourage some potential purchasers and
readers. They shouldn't worry. Happily, Professor Levi has eschewed technical terminology and has adopted a concrete, case-illustrated method of
presentation of his subject.

He summarizes this subject as "an attempt to describe generally the
process of legal reasoning in the field of case law and in the interpretation
of statutes and of the Constitution." That is a rather large order.
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The central thesis of his analysis is one that has been stated many times.'
Legal reasoning is reasoning by example from case to case. Although the pretense is that legal reasoning consists of the application of a system of known
rules to particular sets of facts, the reality is that legal reasoning consists of a
process of determining differences and similarities between the case at hand
and previous cases. This is a process of classification in which rules arise
but constantly change as new cases are presented. New determinations of
differences and similarities result in new or changed rules. This process is all
to the good since law can thereby follow accepted ideas in the community
and erroneous ideas can be weeded out.
This central theme is illustrated in case law by the line of cases culminating in MacPherson v.Buick Motor Co., in the field of statutory interpretation by the series of cases interpreting the Mann Act, and in the field of
Constitutional law by the cases outlining the federal power over interstate
commerce. In each field, the author asserts, the process works out somewhat
differently.
In case law it issaid legal reasoning results inthree general states of legal concepts (Professor Levi apparently has an aversion to the term "rule").
As cases are compared a legal concept emerges. Similarity and difference are
seen in the terms of a rule or of rules. In the second stage the concept or
rule is more or less 'fixed, and reasoning by example places cases inside or
outside the concept. Finally, in the third stage, reasoning by example results
in the breakdown of the rule or concept and perhaps the emergence of a
broader rule or a number of narrower rules. The rules, then, are not what
is usually pretended. They are not fixed major premises for application
by deduction to particular sets of facts.
Certainly the cases culminating in the MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.
case furnish an apt, if familiar, illustration of the idea. From 1816 to 1851,
a series of cases outlining liability in certain circumstances led to the
concept of liability with respect to things dangerous in themselves. Then
followed a series of cases which by analogy to previous cases placed newly
presented facts within or without this concept. From this series of cases
a new concept finally emerged and swallowed up the old. The concept of
1. For example, Austin says in his laborious fashion, "In truth, when it is said that a
litigated case is analogous to another case, one of the following meanings is commonly
imported by the phrase. It is meant that the litigated case bears to the other case, a specific
and proximate resemblance; and that the former ought to be decided, on account of the
alleged resemblance, by a given statute or rule in which the latter is included. Or else it is
meant that the litigatcd bears to the other case a generic and remoter resemblance; and
that the former should be brought or forced, on account of the alleged resemblance
wsithin a statute or rule by which the latter is comprised: that is to say, that a new rule
of judiciary law, resembling a statute or rule by which the latter is comprised, ought
to be made by the Court, and applied to the case in controversy." JOHN AtJs1t1, Lectures
on Jurisprudence, 1039, 1040,
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liability for things probably dangerous makes the former concept obsolete.
That is the proof offered with respect to case law. But the emphasis is
on the method of reasoning (if this is a description of reasoning at all).
In the attempt to describe this method generally with illustration by one
line of cases in a particular field of tort liability, there is, however, no
recognition of the importance of the substance of cases in determining
the reasoning used on appeals. The result is an unrealistic description of
the handling of past cases. It is like a general description of the process
of statutory interpretation. The techniques and methods of interpretation
may be generally analyzed and described; but after all is said, it is still
true that the subject matter and word content of the statute, all the circumstances surrounding its enactment and enforcement, the facts of the
case before the court, and other substantive elements will dictate the
method of interpretation in a particular case. Likewise, the substance of
the case will influence, if not determine, the method of reasoning and the
handling of previous cases in a particular case governed by case law.
Partly for this reason, it may be that the author's description of legal
reasoning is not entirely adequate to describe the handling of past cases
on appeal. There are other indications that it is not complete. If the
quotation of popular summaries of case law is any clue, overworked justices may still indulge in some old fashioned deductive reasoning, particularly in routine cases. After all, many appeals should never have been
taken. In many well-considered opinions there is an enunciation of a
principle which is said to control the case, but there is no indication in
previous cases or in the opinions that the principle was arrived at by a
process of reasoning by analogy. On the other hand, there must still be
cases where legal reasoning amounts to a search for some authority to
justify a conclusion arrived at by some process other than reasoning by
analogy. Analysis of various series of cases other than the group chosen
by the author would lead to somewhat different conclusions.
Nor is there any proof that the general description is accurate or complete at the trial court level, or for that matter, at the level of the practicing attorney engaged merely in dispensing advice.
Then too, lurking behind the author's analysis are certain broad, general
ideas about our legal system. A thorough critique would require that these
be brought to light.
Apparently the process of legal reasoning in case law is too diverse for
a single explanation, but nevertheless, Professor Levi has done an excellent
job in explaining one of the important facets of that subject.
The next section deals with statutory interpretation. It is stated that
here reasoning by example proceeds from the kind of examples the statutory
words call to mind. A court can escape from prior cases by a new reference
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to legislative intent; but the author believes that once a decisive interpretation of legislative intent has been made, a court should subsequently
follow the direction indicated by that interpretation. The Caminetli case
is termed such a case in the application of the Mann Act. Apparently the
statement is that the courts also actually follow such a direction although
judges frequently rebel. The Mann'Act cases are used for illustrative
purposes, but there is some question whether they may be taken as typical.
Certainly a great many series of cases in the state courts do not on their
face indicate a process of reasoning by example from a beacon-light case.
They may merely state the clear meaning rule. In problems of statutory
interpretation, as in case law, the results are often predictable; but the
process of legal reasoning many times remains obscure. Even where it
does not, there are series of cases where an apparently decisive interpretation is repudiated. It might also be noted that the references to legislative
"intent" in the analysis are not clear. For the most part the comments
concerning the case law section apply here, as well as to the following
section on constitutional law.
In the next section our author illustrates the idea that reasoning by
example in constitutional law cases is modified by the development of
conflicting satellite concepts which always compete for recognition in any
case, and by the technique of appeal back to the Constitution itself as
against results in prior cases. Here again it is not clear that the illustration
by cases interpreting the commerce clause is entirely typical, particularly when cases in state supreme courts are considered.
This volume is entitled an introduction and to this extent does not
purport to be completely descriptive or absolutely definitive. It is a clearer
analysis and more specific than many that have been published. That it is
only a partial description, and that the central theme is neither new nor
different, should not detract from its value. Some persons may be misled
by the "pretense that law is a system of known rules applied by a judge,"
For those who are not, here is a well reasoned and interesting though onesided reminder that the pretense is often just that.
ROBERT MEISENHOLDER

PROFESSOR OF LAW
UNIVERSITY

OF MIAMI

